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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a Section 1983 claim should be allowed
along with a Title IX action where that would be
consistent with this Court’s rulings on concurrent
statutory discrimination claims.
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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The National Association of Women Lawyers
("NAWL") is the oldest women’s bar association in the
country. It was founded in 1899, long before most bar
associations admitted women. Only 30 years before, in
1869, Arabella Babb Mansfield had become the first
woman lawyer admitted to the (Iowa) bar. Only 20
years before, in 1879, Selva A. Lockwood was the first
woman lawyer admitted to the bar of the Supreme
Court. In 1912, NAWL campaigned for women’s voting
rights during the suffrage movement and six years later
sought the right for women to serve on juries. In 1957,
NAWL President Grace B. Doering became the first
woman elected to the ABA Assembly; in 1961 Sarah T.
Hughes became the first woman judge on the United
States District Court; and in 1981 Sandra Day
O’Connor became the first woman to serve as an
Associate Justice of this Court. Today, NAWL is a
national voluntary organization with members in all 50
states, devoted to the interests of women lawyers, as
well as all women. Through its members, committees,
and the Women Lawyers Journal, it provides a
collective voice in the bar, courts, Congress, and
workplace. We stand committed to ensuring access to
the courts for girls and women seeking protection from
gender bias and sexual harassment.
1

Letters of consent are on file with the Clerk. No counsel
for either party has authored any portion of this brief, nor has any
person or entity, other than amie~zs and its counsel, made a
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this
brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The question posed by this case is of enormous
importance. It goes directly to the ability of girls and
women to press for equal educational opportunity and
freedom from harassment in the schools. NAWL was
not a party to the litigation below and does not make a
judgment on the propriety of the grant of summary
judgment on the Title IX claim. Rather, it files this
brief to urge the Court to reject the bright line rule of
the First Circuit, which would preclude women and
girls from bringing equal protection claims in the public
school setting and instead force them to press their
constitutional claims under the much higher and more
difficult standard of deliberate indifference. This Court,
specifically through its decisions of last term, has
reiterated its principle that laws against discrimination,
especially in the employment setting, should be fought
on several fronts. It has extended the number of
traditional causes of action that arise from the same
facts surrounding the claimed discriminatory behavior
- not limited them, as the First Circuit has done. In
keeping with the Court’s direction, girls and women
should not be left to challenge a school, its employees,
and its staff on claims of discrimination with only one
theory. To the contrary, they should be free to make
their challenges on several bases. For all these reasons,
NAWL asks this Court to reverse the decision below as
to the preclusion issue and allow constitutional claims
to go forward under both Title IX and Section 1983.
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ARGUMENT
ALLOWING A SECTION 1983 ACTION ALONG
WITH A TITLE IX ACTION WOULD BE
CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S RULINGS
ON CONCURRENT STATUTORY
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Recently, this Court issued two decisions that
reaffirmed the broad remedial scope of statutory
discrimination statutes. Following that same correct
analysis, the Court should similarly affirm the need for
allowing constitutional clams under Section 1983 as
well as Title IX.
CBOCS v. Humphries
First, in CBOCS West Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct.
1951 (2008), the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981
afforded a plaintiff the opportunity to raise claims of
retaliation in his claim of racial discrimination. There,
Humphries, an African-American Assistant Manager,
claimed that he was dismissed because of his race and
his complaints that another black employee had been
discharged for race-based reasons. Id. at 1954. He
brought an action under Title VII as well as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981. Id.
The company there argued that the language of the
text of Section 1981 does not expressly refer to the
claim of an individual who suffers retaliation because
he has tried to help a different individual, suffering
direct racial discrimination, secure his Section 1981

rights. Id. Therefore, it argued, the statute simply
"does not provide for a cause of action based on
retaliation. " Id. This Court stated that "[w]e agree
with CBOCS that the statute’s language does not
expressly refer" to such a claim, but cautioned "that
fact alone is not sufficient to carry the day." Id. After
all, "the Court has recently read another broadly
worded civil rights statute, namely, Title IX [citation
omitted] as including an antiretaliation remedy." Id. As
for the company’s argument that Congress amended
Section 1981 but did not include an explicit
antiretaliation provision or the word "retaliation" in
the new statutory language, the Court found that
"there was no need for Congress to" do so. Id. That is
because "[n]othing in the statute’s text or in the
surrounding circumstances suggests any congressional
effort to supercede" its previous interpretation. Id.
In response to the company’s argument that Title
VII already contains procedural and administrative
requirements and "overlaps" Section 1981, this Court
stated:

Regardless, we have previously acknowledged
a "necessary overlap" between Title VII and §
1981. [Citation omitted.] We have added that
the "remedies available under Title VII and
under § 1981, although related, and although
directed to most of the same ends, are separate,
distinct, and independent." [Citation omitted.]
We have pointed out that Title VII provides
important administrative remedies and other
benefits that § 1981 lacks. [Citation omitted.]
And we have concluded that "Title VII was
designed to supplement, rather than supplant,
existing laws and institutions relating to
employment discrimination."
[Citation
omitted.] In a word, we have previously held
that the "overlap" reflects congressional design.
[Citation omitted.] We have no reason to reach
a different conclusion in this case.
Id. (emphasis added).
The same can be said for claims under Title IX and
Section 1983. Although there may exist an "overlap" or
relation between both causes of action, their "ends" are
separate in how each is prosecuted, the evidence
required for each such cause of action, and the parties
affected by each cause of action.
Gomez-Perez v. Potter
Similarly, in Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931,
1943 (2008), this Court recognized a retaliation claim

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 as amended ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a). Again,
it upheld additional theories to combat illegal
discrimination, holding that a federal employee could
assert a claim under the federal-sector provision of the
ADEA. Id. at 1935. In that case, a 45-year old woman
brought suit against her federal employer, initially
claiming age discrimination and then claiming that her
employer retaliated against her for bringing the prior
action. Id. The employer moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. Id. The
First Circuit affirmed the order but on the grounds that
§ 633a(a) of the ADEA did not allow recovery for
retaliation claims. Id. at 1935-36.
In discussing whether the federal employer had
waived sovereign immunity, this Court stated the
following:

[The employer] is of course correct that "[a]
waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign
immunity must be unequivocally expressed in
statutory text" and "will be strictly construed,
in terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign."
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996). But
this rule of construction is satisfied here.
Subsection (c) of § 633a unequivocally waives
sovereign immunity for a claim brought by
"[a]ny person aggrieved" to remedy a violation
of § 633a. Unlike § 633a(c), § 633a(a) (2000 ed.,
Supp. V) is not a waiver of sovereign immunity;
it is a substantive provision outlawing
"discrimination." That the waiver in § 633a(c)
applies to § 633a(a) claims does not mean that
§ 633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle
as § 633a(c). See United States v. White
Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465,472-473
(2003) (where one statutory provision
unequivocally provides for a waiver of
sovereign immunity to enforce a separate
statutory provision, that latter provision "’need
not.., be construed in the manner appropriate
to waivers of sovereign immunity’" (quoting
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 218-219
(1983))). But in any event, even if § 633a(a)
must be construed in the same manner as §
633a(c), we hold, for the reasons previously
explained, that § 633a(a) prohibits retaliation
with the requisite clarity.

Id. at 1942-43. Once again, the Court did not force the
plaintiff to overcome a high hurdle in order to maintain
her cause of action for retaliation.
In these two cases, the Court has reaffirmed a
commitment to promoting varied causes of action to
alleviate discriminatory practices. It has not limited
the means by which these ends are sought. To the
contrary, it has expanded the means to accomplish
these ends and read the anti-discrimination statutes
expansively, so as to encompass those causes of action
that would logically ensue from claims of
discrimination. In contrast, the First Circuit in
Fitzgerald has taken precisely the opposite tack, i.e.,
limited the number of ways in which to recover for
discrimination.
The Court has also made clear that a public sector
plaintiff claiming discrimination based on gender can
bring a Title VII claim, a § 1983 claim (alleging
violations of equal protection), or both. See Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234-35 (1979); Annis v. County
of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 254-55 (2d Cir. 1994)
(noting "every circuit that has considered this issue has
held that Title VII is not the exclusive remedy for
discrimination against state or municipal employers,
where those claims derive from violations of
Constitutional rights."). Likewise, a plaintiff who
claims gender discrimination in the public school
setting deserves the same opportunities. Assuming
that she can prove independent bases for a Title IX
claim as well as a § 1983 claim, she should be able to go
forth with both or either causes of action. To hold
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otherwise would defeat the purpose behind both
statutes and go against the reasoning this Court has
wisely followed in other discrimination cases.
In conclusion, as the Court acknowledged a
generation ago, "our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination." Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). Through a
century plus three decades and more of that history,
women did not count among voters composing "We the
People"; not until 1920 did women gain a constitutional
right to the franchise. Id. at 685. And for half a century
thereafter, "it remained the prevailing doctrine that
government, both federal and state, could withhold
from women opportunities accorded men so long as any
’basis in reason’ could be conceived for the
discrimination." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 532 (1996). It was not until 1971 that, for the first
time in our history, this Court ruled in favor of a
woman who complained that her state had denied her
the equal protection of its laws. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 73 (1971). Since Reed, the Court has repeatedly
recognized that neither federal nor state government,
nor this nation’s schools, act compatibly with the equal
protection principle when they deny "to women, simply
because they are women, full citizenship stature -equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in and
contribute to society based on their individual talents
and capacities." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at
532.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court
of appeals should be reversed as to the preclusion issue.
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